Strategic Doctrine for a Post-SALT World by Stein, Arthur
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
PEACE STUDIES PROGRAM
Occasional Papers
STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR A POST-SALT WORLD
by Arthur Stein
Number 4

Strategic Doctrine for a Post-SALT World
Arthur Stein

With the advent of strategic bombing and nuclear 
weapons arose arguments over appropriate targets, cities 
or military targets/ The argument has recently been re­
vived as scholars have increasingly expressed disenchant­
ment with assured destruction as a basis for deterrence. 
Counterforce, or some variant, as a targetting doctrine has
2 gained new proponents. It even appears that the Nixon 
Administration’s strategic thinking contains elements of 
counterforce
Yet, the argument between proponents of countercity
and counterforce targetting has been carried on in a 
vacuum, for the proponents of the various doctrines fail 
to agree on the major premises and values that necessarily 
underlie the choice of a particular strategy. Thus, they 
talk past each other. Furthermore, the discussion centers 
on which targetting doctrine is superior, without discussing 
the general context in which the doctrine would be adopted 
or the more complicated situation caused by a switch from 
one strategy to another. One could conceive of doctrines 
with equivilent utilities, but where the switch from one to 
the other would, of itself, be destabilizing. This paper will 
examine the advisability of a switch in targetting doctrine, 
given certain major premises and the present historical 
context.
Deterrent Stability
One major premise or value that can be agreed upon is 
2that no switch in doctrine should upset deterrent stability. 
A switch in doctrine can adversely affect deterrent stability 
in three ways: 1) the affect on respective values of first 
and second strike; 2) the appearance of a potential first 
strike or a doctrine for political advantage; and 3) the 
possibility of an arms race.^
It has been generally agreed that an increase in either 
side’s value of first strike and decrease in their value of
5
second strike are destabilizing. A switch in doctrine to 
counterforce or some variant would be destabilizing if the 
Soviets see such a posture as less of a sanction than retal­
iatory assured destruction, resulting in an increase in their 
value of first strike.Thus, depending on the Soviet view 
of an American switch in doctrine, such a switch could be 
destabilizing.
It has been generally argued that a switch to counter­
force would look like a first strike doctrine to the
7
Soviets.' For this reason, Russett has argued for a counter­
combatant retaliatory posture that would specifically exempt
o
Russian missiles as targets. Yet, Russett's doctrine can
Q
also be seen as a potential counterforce doctrine. Inter­
estingly enough, neither counterforce nor countercombatant 
doctrine is a first strike doctrine. But if a switch to 
such a doctrine brings on fears that the United States is 
indeed going for a first strike capability, or intends to 
put the Soviets in a politically disadvantageous position, 
then it would indeed be destabilizing.10 This was certainly 
the case with the short-lived McNamara switch to counterforce 11
3Such was also the case with the Soviet deployment of the
Galosh ABM around Moscow. This act was in itself not destabi­
lizing, but the fear that the Soviets would extend and expand 
the system contributed to the American decision to go ahead
12with MIRV. Similarly, counterforce or countercombatant 
might be seen as destabilizing by the Soviets because of the 
requirements for better intelligence and greater targetting 
accuracy.1^ Once again, depending on the Soviet perception of 
an American switch in doctrine, such a switch could be 
destabilizing.
The switch to counterforce would also be destabilizing 
if it led to an arms race.^ This danger is particularly 
acute in the post-SALT strategic situation. The SALT Agreement 
on offensive weapons places an interim ceiling on such missies. 
It is clear that the present situation is quite stable, and 
would not be affected by even a major increase in the number
1 5of either side's offensive missiles. But SALT is vulnerable 
to a qualitative arms race, for such changes are not prohibited.1 
A switch to counterforce would particularly be vulnerable to 
a qualitative arms race, for it is a doctrine that requires 
technological advances in accuracy. Again the Russian response 
is central in determining the implication of a switch in 
doctrine.
It can therefore be concluded that at the worst, a switch 
to counterforce doctrine would be destabilizing; at the very 
best, it would not be any more stabilizing than the present 
doctrine. Which it would be depends on the Russian perception 
and response. Therefore, as a unilaterally enunciated doctrine 
that can be adopted without concern for the Russian response, 
counterforce would very likely be destabilizing, for the 
Russian response is critical. This conclusion is strengthened 
by looking at the developments in Soviet strategic doctrine 
and SALT.
Soviet strategic doctrine has never been clearly articu­
lated, it has always been inferred from political statements 
and weapon deployments. Thus there is little agreement on 
Soviet doctrine in the 1960s. Some have inferred that Soviet 
doctrine contained elements of counterforce and would thus 
have been amenable to a counterforce strategy by the United
17States. They explain the Soviet denunciation of McNamara’s 
counterforce doctrine as due to Soviet technological backward­
ness that made such a doctrine technically feasible for them 
only in the middle 1960s. ° Others have inferred that Soviet 
doctrine was countercity, and stressing the finality of any 
nuclear war. Whatever the inference of Soviet strategic 
doctrine, it is clear that the Soviets were very enamored with 
defensive ABM systems. American strategic analysts saw city 
oriented ABMs as destabilizing in depriving the enemy of one’s 
population as hostage for retaliation. The Soviets denied the 
destabilizing nature of ABM systems. Premier Kosygin remarked 
at a press conference in London on February 10, 1967:
What weapons should be regarded as a factor making 
for tension — offensive or defensive? I believe 
that the defensive systems, which prevent attack, 
are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute 
a factor preventing the death of people.20
5Thus, the Soviets did not fully accept the American 
criteria for mutual deterrence. To the extent that the 
Soviets did not accept American strategic thinking, they 
were often seen in Washington as primitive and backward. 
Many attempts were made to socialize the Russians in
21strategic thinking. Johnson and McNamara desired early 
negotiations to end deployment of ABM systems. When such 
attempts failed, they pushed for an American ABM equivalent, 
but one designed to protect missile installations and
22 therefore not to be destabilizing.
By the middle of the SALT discussions, it became clear 
that the American strategic thinkers had been successful in
23 their attempts to socialize the Russians. y In fact, the 
Russians turned the Americans' own arguments against them 
and argued for a comprehensive agreement on defensive systems 
with a separate interim agreement on offensive weapons. The 
American position favored a comprehensive offensive and def­
ensive agreement. The Americans compromised, and the SALT 
Agreement contains an indefinite permanent agreement strictly 
limiting ABM systems. There are limits on the number of 
sites, on the number of missiles, on the radar, and on 
future technological developments.^
The SALT Agreement thus enshrines mutual assured
25 destruction and depreciates any emphasis on defense.
It strictly limits ABMs but only puts an interim ceiling on 
offensive systems. Each side thus assures the other of its 
population as hostage. The SALT Agreement marks the Soviet 
6acceptance of American criteria of mutual deterrence based 
on assured destruction, and recent Soviet remarks ape American
26 statements on deterrence.
After such a long and difficult task of socializing the 
Russians into the American view of deterrence, a uni­
lateral shift in American doctrine would be extremely destab-
27 ilizing. While this says nothing the desirability of 
counterforce as a targetting doctrine, it seems clear that any 
move to such a doctrine would have to be done in conjunction 
with the Russians. For this goal, SALT could provide the 
required vehicle for beginning a dialogue on targetting 
strategy.2^
Ex Ante and Ex Post Deterrence
There has been much discussion of rationality in 
deterrence thinking, 7 Many have pointed out that deter­
rence based on a countercity assured destruction retalia­
tory threat is irrational.All things being equal, one 
would want to threaten the maximum in retailiation to get 
the most deterrent benefit. Yet, it would be irrational to 
go through with this threat.If the Soviets strike the U.S. 
first in a counterforce attack, for the United States to 
retaliate against Soviet cities in a spasmodic response would 
give the Soviets the greatest incentive to use their remaining 
missiles against American cities. The result would be an 
irrational orgy of destruction. Further, such a posture 
only conceives of deterrence prior to any war. Once the firing 
begins, all the stops are pulled out, and no consideration 
7is given to the possibility of continuing deterrence into the 
war. A spate of recent literature on war termination has 
pointed out that most wars have ended prior to the total 
destruction of either adversary. Many have pointed out 
that after the fact (ex post), a more rational strategy would 
be one that extended deterrence into the war, that attempted 
a negotiated settlement by bargaining, and that gave one’s 
enemy continued incentives not to strike one’s cities.
Thus, there appears to be a tension between ex ante 
(before the fact) and ex post deterrence, or between deterrence 
and defense.One wants to threaten the maximum sanction 
before the fact, but it is irrational to go through with it 
after the fact. There are two potential solutions: raise the 
ex post deterrent credibility, or lower the ex ante threat. 
Some have suggested a "doomsday machine" that would trigger 
automatic retaliation, thus assuring one’s enemy that after 
the fact one would go through with one’s prior threat. The 
other solution is to threaten a lesser sanction before the 
fact, thereby raising the credibility that one will go through
35 with it. The latter is the solution suggested by the pro­
ponents of counterforce. The problem of this is that the 
lesser sanction may lead to greater provocations by one’s 
enemies, and the increased capability and credibility of less 
than all out response will assure the threatened response. 
The end result would be to make war more likely, which was a 
major criticism of McNamara’s enunciation of counterforce in
371962
8Thus, one can conclude that the flexibility of altern­
ative targets and a retargetting capability are desirable 
aspects of counterforce, especially for ex post deterrence. 
It is less clear that it is desirable to have counterforce 
as an announced doctrine before the fact. Indeed, the 
optimum strategy appears to be a switching one. Russett, 
having forseen such a counter-argument, points out the 
unlikelihood of keeping secret the intention not to go
39 through with one’s announced threat. Yet this would not 
be necessary. One possible strategy would be to continue 
the threat of countercity assured destruction, but to obtain 
and announce the capability of limited strategic war without 
announcing the targets (cities or military installations)
This conclusion seems to be partially strengthened by 
the propect of nuclear proliferation. It appears inevitable 
that further nuclear proliferation will require various 
targetting plans and a retargetting capability. As for 
announced doctrine in a multipolar nuclear world, this 
becomes even more problematic.
Targetting Doctrine under Strategic Multipolarity
When strategic multipolarity catches up with the already 
existing political multipolarity, the question of strategic 
doctrine will arise anew, but will be more difficult to
41 answer because of the imponderables of nuclear proliferation.
The future process of horizontal proliferation is not 
clear. New members of the nuclear club are likely to come 
in pairs: Israel and Egypt, India and Pakistan. Will such
9new members go for an all-azimuth capability or will they 
focus their capability only against their local rivals? 
The answer is uncertain but the evidence is not encouraging. 
Of the present three minor nuclear powers, only Britain has 
specified one enemy (Soviet Union), while France and China 
have declared an all-azimuth strategy. Further, whether or 
not they desire an all-azimuth capability, new nuclear powers 
are likely to have so few missiles that they would not be 
able to adopt a counterforce second strike posture, or even 
a counterforce first strike posture.^ And in this context 
of non-reciprocation, it is not clear that the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. would want to announce a counterforce doctrine, 
especially since such a posture would require targetting 
added numbers of missiles to deter minor states.
The future of vertical proliferation is also not clear 
for the post-SALT period. In one respect, by closing off the 
ABM option, the superpowers have limited vertical proliferation 
along these lines. Yet, by allowing technological improve­
ments in offensive systems, they have left the door open 
for further verticle proliferation in existing systems.^ 
Such an increasing technological gap between major and minor 
nuclear powers does not increase the likelihood of the 
adoption of counterforce targetting. First, to have two 
different targetting strategies, one for major states and 
one for minor states, would be politically costly. Second, 
counterforce targetting vzould require the expenditure of a 
larger number of missies than assured destruction. The 
10
major powers would not be able to afford counterforce target­
ting vis-a-vis each other if a nuclear exchange between them 
might leave either power unable to deter remaining nuclear 
powers.^ And to deter all potential nuclear rivals with a 
counterforce doctrine might require many more missiles than 
either superpower presently possesses (thus leading to an arms 
race), and would be a luxury given the likely non-reciprocation 
of minor nuclear powers.
Yet, one can conceive of contingencies and scenarios for 
which countercity targetting does not appear feasible. In a 
multipolar nuclear world the possibility exists of anonymous 
a 5
delivery. In such a case, the proper deterrent doctrine is 
not clear. Should one retaliate against all the existing 
nuclear powers, or retaliate at random, or not retaliate at 
all? The solution is not clear, but the problem represents an 
attack on the notion of deterrence by threatened reprisal, and 
a switch to counterforce may increase the attractiveness of 
retaliation, but does not solve the doctrinal problem of who 
to strike.
Conclusion
The possibility presently exists of divorcing, for the 
first time, two notions that have previously been inexorably 
linked: strategic weapons and mass destruction. This possibi­
lity is indeed intriguing, especially given the repugnancy of 
countercity assured destruction.But is such a switch in 
doctrine desirable, even with Soviet concurrence, if it will 
result in a greater recourse to the use of strategic weapons?
11
Perhaps, in a multipolar nuclear context, the answer is yes, 
for theoreticians argue that war is more likely in multi­
polar systems than in bipolar systems anyway.Thus, 
the added increase in war likelihood associated with a 
switch in doctrine may be worth the damage and destruction 
that might be avoided. Even so, the problems raised in this 
paper are formidable ones for counterforce proponents to deal
with
12
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no-cities, or city-avoidence. This strategy would assure 
retaliation (in massive or controlled rates of fire) against 
the opponent’s missiles or military installations, etc.,
but not against his cities. The other strategy is one of 
limited strategic retaliation in a controlled fashion, but 
without any assurance as to probable targets. In this 
strategy one would stage demonstration strikes (perhaps 
of an increasing escalatory nature) against cities or 
missiles or military installations. There would be no 
assurance to the enemy that cities would be spared, indeed 
quite the opposite, cities would be held as hostage and could 
be struck at any time. For a delineation of the difference 
between these two strategies see either piece by Schelling, 
op. cit., and Wagstaff, op. cit. For discussions of these 
strategies, see Fryklund, op. cit.; Morton H. Halperin, 
"’No-Cities,”' op. cit., Limited War, op. cit., Contemporary 
Military Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), and 
Defense Strategy for the Seventies (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co., 1971); Y. Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (Jeru­
salem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966); 
Morton A. Kaplan, The Strategy of Limited Retaliation (Prince­
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University, Center for International 
Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 19> April 19> 1959); Klaus 
Knorr and Thornton Read, editors, Limited Strategic War (New 
York: Praeger, 1962); Moulton, op. cit.; and Paul Ramsey, 
The Limits of Nuclear War (New York: The Council on Religion 
and International Affairs, 1963). One should of course con­
sult the most prolific scenario writer, see among his many 
works, Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, i960), and Paradigm, op. 
cit.
34. This has been pointed out by numerous authors, and is also 
referred to as the difference between a war deterrent doctrine 
and a war waging doctrine.
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35. Kahn, On Thermonuclear, op. cit,, was one to suggest the 
doomsday machine. Rosecrance, The Future, op. cit., ch. 8, 
has discussed the possibilities.
36. One can think of an imperfect analogy to recent foreign 
policy, Dulles enunciated massive retaliation as a 
foreign policy doctrine. He was immediately attacked for 
stating a doctrine that was not credible, especially when 
the Soviets obtained the capability to strike the U.S. 
directly. His critics argued for a scaled down deterrent 
threat, one that stressed flexible controlled response, 
and in the Kennedy years American conventional capabilities 
were built up. Yet, the Dulles years saw few Russian provo­
cations and no American war involvement. Dulles and Eisen­
hower threatened a great deal and talked in lofty moral terms, 
but in the crunch did not intervene in Indochirtf and Hungary. 
On the other hand, the Kennedy years of flexible response
saw increased Russian provocations, with the assured American 
flexible response that ended in interventions and war in­
volvement and a period of great tension. While one cannot 
argue that a shift to flexible response caused increased 
Russian provocations, it was certainly met by increased 
Russian provocations, and certainly resulted in American 
intervention that went through with the ex ante threat in 
flexible response fashion.
Brown’s, op. cit., pp. 47-■2+9, model indicates "that the net 
effect of increased flexiblility is to decrease the prob­
ability of a nuclear disaster, provided that the 'aggressive- 
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ness’ of each side remains constant.” However, he points 
out that "the gain in stability which results from an increase 
in flexibility can easily be wiped out by an increase in 
aggressiveness.”
37. Brower, op. cit., p. 15: "The more we prepare to try to win 
/“or to fight_7 a war, instead of to forestall it, the more 
likely we are to have to fight it.” The addition in the above 
quotation is mine, but I think it is a correct inference 
from the Brower article.
38. See both of the pieces by Intriligator, on. cit. Note that 
Intriligator finds a switching strategy to be an optimum one 
during the war. What is even more interesting, but not 
pointed out by Intriligator, is that his switching strategy
is the optimum one irregardless of what the announced doctrine 
was prior to the war.
39. Russett, op. cit., pp. 23^-235.
Zj.0. Note that this is the limited strategic retaliation option, 
and not the counterforce option. This approach attempts to 
get around the ex ante versus ex post problem by threatening 
a great deal before the fact, and going through with it after 
the fact but in a controlled and limited fashion that hopes 
for an end to the war prior to using all of one’s missiles. 
George H. Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York: 
Wiley, 1966), argues that such a strategy of restraint was 
attempted early in World War II and he analyzes its failure 
and eventual escalation. John R. Raser and Wayman J. Crow, 
"A Simulation Study of Deterrence Theories,” in Proceedings 
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of the International Peace Research Association Inaugural 
Conference (Netherlands: Royal VanGorcum Ltd., 1966), did 
a simulation of the stability effects of the acquisition by 
one power of the capacity to delay fire, though an imperfect 
analogy at best, it provides some evidence that a switch to 
a limited strategic war doctrine would have mixed effects 
on stability.
41 . For wideranging discussions of strategic doctrine in a 
context of strategic proliferation, see the essays in 
Rosecrance, The Future, on. cit. One should also look at 
Herman Kahn, "Nuclear Proliferation and Rules of Retalia­
tion," The Yale Law Journal, November 1966, and Herman Kahn 
and Carl Dibble, "Criteria for Long-Range Nuclear Control 
Policies," California Law Review, May 1967.
42. See the Hoag essay in Rosecrance, The Future, op. cit., though 
some of the other essays are also relevant on these points.
This point of the non-reciprocation of minor nuclear 
powers to an American switch to counterforce targetting, 
provides an insight to the probable effects of such a switch 
on our NATO allies (specifically Britain and France).
A switch to counterforce might be seen, at first glance, 
to strengthen our commitment to defend Western Europe. After 
all, counterforce targetting would allow the U.S. to be the 
first to use nuclear weapons in response to a Russian attack 
on Western Europe. And, moreover, this threat would be 
credible for the possibility would exist that the Soviets
would reciprocate and spare American cities. As long as the 
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U.S. had a countercity targetting doctrine, an American 
first use of nuclear weapons to defend Europe is not credible 
since the result would be the Russian destruction of American 
cities.
m However, a switch to counterforce would also be destabi­
lizing. After all, Britain and France do not have enough 
nuclear weapons (or the targetting accuracy) to afford a 
counterforce doctrine. Their doctrine has been a countercity 
one. Thus, in the event of war in Europe, they would undercut 
the American posture ny striking Russian cities, and the 
Russians, if unable to distinguish the firing source, would 
retaliate against American cities. Thus, an American switch 
to counterforce might be seen as an attempt to undermine the 
European deterrent. This was exactly the case with McNamara’s 
doctrine which was first announced at a NATO meeting. McNamara 
intended the counterforce doctrine to undermine the European 
deterrent (see McNamara, '’’No-Cities,'" op. cit.), and his 
announcement was clearly read that way, and was probably 
another factor leading to strained American-French relations 
late in 1962 and through 1963. Not only would the American 
switch undermine the European deterrent, but the European 
non-reciprocation would strain the alliance and would under­
cut the American counterforce posture.
43. MIRV would be one example.
44. A discussion of the contemporary possibilities, given the 
existing tripolarity, is to oe found in Harry G. Gelber, 
"The Impact of Chinese ICBM's on Strategic Deterrence,"
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Orbis, Summer 1969- It is interesting to note that Gelber’s 
suggested solution of ABM deployment has been precluded by 
the SALT I agreement. For more theoretical discussions 
("dilemma of the victor’s inheritance"), see Rosecrance, 
The Future, op. cit., ch. 8. Quester's essay in the same 
volume also deals with this problem, see ch. £•-.
45. See Rosecrance, The Future, op, cit., ch. 8, and International 
Relations, op. cit., pp. 285-287. It should be noted that
the United States and the Soviet Union have signed an agree­
ment to insure against this possibility occurring between 
themselves, see "Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War 
Outbreak," agreement signed at Washington on September 30» 
1971, in U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties 
and Other International Agreements, vol. 22, pt. 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). The agree­
ment calls for improvement of existing arrangements to guard 
against accidental or unauthorized firings, for notifica­
tion in case of such firings, for notification in the case 
of detection of unidentified objects, and for notification 
of missile launchings that travel beyond one’s territory.
This agreement has provisions with potenially far reaching 
implications, as the possibility of installation of self- 
destruct devices on each missile. I am indebted to Professor 
Harry Gelber for pointing this out to me.
46. As a result many have suggested looking at the broader 
aspects of deterrence, and focusing on the flip side of 
deterrence, namely deterrence by reward instead of punish-
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ment, or positive sanctions, see David A. Baldwin, "Thinking 
About Threats," Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1971 > 
and Rosecrance, The Future, op. cit., ch. 11. All sorts of 
possibilities then open up in terms of interdependence. See 
the short discussion of strategic interdependence in Richard 
Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or 
Reality?" World Politics, October 1973 a forthcoming.
47. No one has more clearly shown the absurdity of mutual assured 
destruction than Donald Brennan. He has suggested that 
mutual assured destruction could be acheived quite cheaply
by a Soviet-American agreement to mine each other's cities, 
see Brennan in "Strategic Forum," op. cit.
48. See Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and 
the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1966.
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